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Abstract—We propose and analyze secret key generation using
intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) assisted wireless communi-
cation networks. To this end, we first formulate the minimum
achievable secret key capacity for an IRS acting as a passive
beamformer in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. Next,
we develop an optimization framework for the IRS reflecting
coefficients based on the secret key capacity lower bound. To
derive a tractable and efficient solution, we design and analyze
a semidefinite relaxation (SDR) and successive convex approx-
imation (SCA) based algorithm for the proposed optimization.
Simulation results show that employing our IRS-based algorithm
can significantly improve the secret key generation capacity for
a wide-range of wireless channel parameters.
Index Terms—Intelligent reflecting surface, physical layer se-
curity, secret key generation, semidefinite relaxation, successive
convex approximation.
I. INTRODUCTION
INTELLIGENT reflecting surface (IRS) is a promisingemerging communication architecture for future wireless
networks, which enables smart reconfiguring of the signal
propagation environment by using passive reflecting elements
with controllable amplitudes and/or phase shifts [1]. By ap-
plying large-scale passive beamforming signal processing, IRS
has been shown to effectively improve the data transmission
performance by combating deleterious wireless channel con-
ditions such as co-channel interference and dead-zones [2].
Recently, IRS has also been considered for improving the
physical layer security in wireless communication networks
[3], [4]. Most of these works focused on investigating the
information-theoretic secrecy transmission and have not con-
sidered the use of IRS for wireless secret key generation.
Secret key generation is a lightweight physical layer security
approach which allows legitimate users to establish shared
keys based on the correlation between their reciprocal chan-
nels. In such scenarios, it is challenging for the eavesdropper
to acquire information about the generated keys since there is
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typically low correlation between the eavesdropper channels
and the legitimate channels. In [5], the high directionality and
sparsity of millimetre-wave wireless channels were exploited
to prevent attacks from co-located eavesdroppers by employing
large-scale active beamforming at the transmitter. In [6], the
authors considered secret key generation with untrusted relays,
where the secret key capacity was optimized independently for
the source-to-relay and relay-to-destination links. Recently in
[7], we showed that a high scattering multipath channel en-
vironment can significantly improve the security of generated
keys.
In this paper, inspired by the aforementioned works, we
consider the use of IRS as a new degree of freedom (DoF)
for wireless secret key generation where each element is an
individual scatterer to boost the secret key capacity. Due to the
use of passive beamforming at the IRS, a major challenge for
secret key generation is the need to jointly optimize both of
the IRS links to the legitimate users. Different from previous
works, we assume that the legitimate users are low-cost single
antenna devices and the main security advantage is from the
large-scale IRS. Our main contributions are as follows:
• We derive a new closed-form expression for a lower
bound on the secret key capacity of IRS assisted wireless
networks with multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers. Our
analytical expression accurately characterizes the impact
of the channel correlations between the legitimate users,
eavesdroppers and IRS.
• We develop an optimization framework for the IRS coef-
ficients based on our analytical lower bound expression
that maximizes the minimum secret key capacity for the
worst-case eavesdropper channel.
• To overcome the non-convexity of the objective func-
tion, we derive a low-complexity algorithm by applying
semidefinite relaxation (SDR) and successive convex ap-
proximation (SCA) for the IRS coefficient matrix.
Simulations validate that the proposed algorithm can signifi-
cantly improve the secret key capacity, and we highlight the
importance of carefully optimizing the IRS coefficients based
on the line-of-sight (LoS) channel conditions and eavesdropper
locations.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1 shows an IRS assisted wireless communication net-
work, where a single-antenna wireless access point (Alice) and
a single-antenna mobile user (Bob) want to generate shared
secret keys based on their reciprocal wireless channels, while
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2Fig. 1. System model for an IRS assisted wireless communication network.
K single antenna non-colluding eavesdroppers (Eves) attempt
to access the secret keys generated by Alice and Bob based
on their own channel observations. The secret key generation
between Alice and Bob is assisted by Rose, who is an N -
element IRS that can modify her reflecting coefficients to
minimize the secret key leakage to Eves.
To generate their shared secret keys, we assume that Alice
and Bob will alternatively exchange pilots and perform chan-
nel estimations in time-division duplex (TDD) mode. In the
odd time slots, Alice transmits pilot s1, and the received signal
at Bob or the kth Eve is given by
yi,1 = (h˜ai + h˜
H
riΦh˜ar)s1 + zi, i ∈ {b, ek}, (1)
where h˜ai ∈ C1×1, h˜ar ∈ CN×1, and h˜ri ∈ CN×1 are the
direct channel from Alice to node i, the incident channel from
Alice to Rose, and the reflected channel from Rose to Bob or
Eve k, respectively. For the IRS channel, similar to [1] and
[2], we assume that Φ = diag(α1ejθ1 , α2ejθ2 , . . . , αNejθN )
denotes the diagonal amplitude-phase shifting reflecting co-
efficient matrix of Rose, where αn ∈ [0, 1] and θn ∈ [0, 2pi)
are the amplitude and phase shifts on the incident signal by
its nth element, n = 1, . . . , N . We denote zi ∼ CN (0, σ2i )
as the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). Similarly, once yb,1
is received, Bob sends pilot s2 in the even time slots, thus
Alice or Eve k receives
yi,2 = (h˜bi + h˜
H
riΦh˜br)s2 + zi, i ∈ {a, ek}, (2)
where h˜bi ∈ C1×1 and h˜br ∈ CN×1 denote the channel from
Bob to node i and Rose, respectively. We assume that the pilot
symbols s1 and s2 have zero mean and unit variance, and are
known by all nodes. We also assume that the sampling interval
is sufficiently small such that the channel reciprocity holds
between the bidirectional pilot transmissions [8]. Therefore,
without loss of generality, the combined channels at each
respective node after normalization can be expressed as
hB = (hab + h
H
rbΦhar) + zb,
hA = (hba + h
H
raΦhbr) + za,
hE1 = (haek + h
H
rek
Φhar) + zek ,
hE2 = (hbek + h
H
rek
Φhbr) + zek .
(3)
In (3), hE1 and hE2 denote the estimated channels in the odd
and even time slots, respectively. After L rounds of pilot ex-
changes within a single coherence time Tc, the combined chan-
nel vectors are denoted as hD = [hD(1), hD(2), . . . , hD(L)],
where D ∈ {A,B,E1, E2}.
III. IRS SECRET KEY CAPACITY LOWER BOUND
In this section, we derive a new closed-form expression for a
lower bound on the secret key capacity of IRS assisted wireless
networks. For general wireless channels, the lower bound on
the secret key capacity can be expressed as [6]
C(hA;hB ‖hE1, hE2) ≥max{I(hA;hB)−I(hA;hE1, hE2),
I(hA;hB)−I(hB ;hE1, hE2)},
(4)
where I(X;Y ) is the mutual information of variables X and
Y , and max {·} is the maximum function. To derive the min-
imum achievable secret key capacity in IRS assisted wireless
communication networks, we assume that the statistics of the
channel state information (CSI) of all channels are known
at Alice and Rose. This is a common assumption in future
large-scale wireless networks where the eavesdroppers may be
authorized but untrusted users attempting to access information
from other users in the network [9]. We note that in non-IRS
systems, e.g, [6], [10], one of the eavesdropper channels hE1
and hE2 can be treated as independent to the other channels
and neglected in the secret key capacity characterization.
A significant challenge in deriving the IRS secret key
capacity is that both hE1 and hE2 should be included in
the mutual information since they contain information of the
reflecting coefficient matrix Φ and the incident channel har
or hbr. In the following, we derive the IRS secret key capacity
lower bound as the worst case security scenario, first derive its
expression and then design an efficient optimization algorithm
to maximize the bound.
Theorem 1: For Eve k, the minimum achievable secret key
capacity in IRS assisted wireless networks is
Clb,k =
1
Tc
log2
(
1 +
K2ab −Kab(Kaek +Kbek)
(Kaek +Kbek + σ
2)(2Kab+σ2)
)
,
(5)
where Kpq = E{(hpq + hHrqΦhpr)(hpq + hHrqΦhpr)∗} is the
correlation function with p ∈ {a, b}, q ∈ {b, ek}, and E{·} is
the expectation with respect to (w.r.t.) the L samples in the
channel vectors.
Proof: In (4), the lower bound is expressed as the maximum
of Clb1,k = I(hA;hB) − I(hA;hE1, hE2) and Clb2,k =
I(hA;hB)−I(hB ;hE1, hE2), so we proceed to derive closed-
form expressions for each term and compare them to obtain
the final expression.
The first term Clb1 can be expressed as
Clb1,k = I(hA;hB)− I(hA;hE1, hE2)
= H(hA|hE1,hE2)−H(hA|hB)
=
1
Tc
log2
det(WAE1E2)KBB
det(WE1E2) det(WAB)
,
(6)
where det(·) is the matrix determinant. The matrix term in the
denominator of (6) is given by
WAE1E2 = E

 hAhE1
hE2
 (h∗A)(h∗E1)(h∗E2)

=
 KAA KAE1 KAE2KAE1 KE1E1 KE1E2
KAE2 KE1E2 KE2E2
,
(7)
3where KPQ = E{hPh∗Q}, P,Q ∈ {A,B,E1, E2}. Further-
more, we can derive that KAA = Kab+σ2a, KBB = Kab+σ
2
b ,
KE1E1 = Kaek +σ
2
ek
, and KE2E2 = Kbek +σ
2
ek
, where Kpq
is the correlation function. As such, we can derive a closed-
form expression of the determinant for (7) as
det(WAE1E2)=KAAKE1E1KE2E2+2KAE1KAE2KE1E2
−K2AE2KE1E1−K2E1E2KAA−K2AE1KE2E2
=(Kaek +Kbek)σ
2
aσ
2
ek
+Kabσ
4
ek
+ σ2aσ
4
ek
.
(8)
Similarly, the determinants of the other matrices in (6) can be
calculated as
det(WE1E2) = (Kaek +Kbek)σ
2
ek
+ σ4ek , (9)
det(WAB) = Kab(σ
2
a + σ
2
b ) + σ
2
aσ
2
b . (10)
Substituting (8)–(10) into (6), we have Clb1,k as shown at the
bottom of this page.
Likewise, we can derive a closed-form expression for the
second term Clb2,k, which is the same as (11) except σ2b in
the numerator is replaced with σ2a. Therefore, Clb,k = Clb1,k
if σ2b ≤ σ2a, otherwise Clb,k = Clb2,k. When we consider all
noises are equal, i.e., σ2a = σ
2
b = σ
2
e = σ
2, both of them can
be simplified as (5), which completes the proof.
IV. PROPOSED SCA-SDR OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we develop a low-complexity optimization
framework to determine the N -element reflecting coefficient
matrix for Rose that maximizes the minimum secret key
capacity amongst all the K non-colluding eavesdroppers. As
such, the optimization problem is formulated as
max
ϕ
min
k∈K
Clb,k (12a)
s.t. |ϕn|2 ≤ 1, n = 1, . . . , N, (12b)
where K = {1, . . . ,K}, |·| is the modulus operator, and ϕn =
αne
jθn is the nth diagonal element of Φ. The constraints in
(12b) applies for αn ∈ [0, 1].
In our derived closed-form expression for the secret key
capacity in (5), we note that Tc is a constant for a given
channel and log2(·) is a monotonically increasing function.
As such, the optimization problem (12) can be rewritten as
max
ϕ
min
k∈K
(
1 +
K2ab −Kab(Kaek +Kbek)
(Kaek +Kbek + σ
2)(2Kab+σ2)
)
(13a)
s.t. |ϕn|2 ≤ 1, n = 1, . . . , N. (13b)
To establish a direct optimization relationship with the IRS
coefficient matrix Φ, we need to calculate Kab, Kaek , and
Kbek . To do so, we define v
H = [v1, v2, . . . , vN ], where vn =
ϕ∗n, and Σpr = diag(h
H
pr), then by rearranging the positions of
the variables as hHprΦhrqh
H
rqΦ
Hhpr = v
HΣprhrqh
H
rqΣ
H
prv,
we can derive the expressions of Kab, Kaek , and Kbek as
Kab = σ
2
hab
+ vHRarbv,
Kaek = σ
2
haek
+ vHRarekv,
Kbek = σ
2
hbek
+ vHRbrekv,
(14)
where σ2hpq = E{hpqh∗pq} and Rprq = E{ΣprhrqhHrqΣHpr},
which is a positive semi-definite covariance matrix of com-
bined channel vectors. Based on (14), we can further expand
the numerator and denominator of (13a) as
hk(v) =a1 + b1v
HRarbv + c1v
HRΣv
+ vHRarbvv
HRarbv + v
HRarbvv
HRΣv,
(15)
gk(v)=a2+b2v
HRarbv+c2v
HRΣv+2v
HRarbvv
HRΣv,
(16)
where we set RΣ = Rarek +Rbrek , and σ
2
Σ = σ
2
haek
+σ2hbek
,
and the scalar terms in (15) and (16) are a1 =σ4hab+σ
2
hab
σ2Σ+
2σ2σ2hab +σ
2σ2Σ +σ
4, b1 = 2σ2hab +σ
2
Σ +2σ
2, c1 = σ2hab +σ
2,
a2 = 2σ
2
hab
σ2Σ +σ
2σ2Σ +2σ
2σ2hab +σ
4, b2 = 2σ2Σ +2σ
2, and
c2 =2σ
2
hab
+σ2.
We note that the objective function in (13a) is non-convex
due to the max-min operations. In the following, we introduce
an auxiliary variable C to transform the optimization based
on (15) and (16) as
max
v,C
C (17a)
s.t. C ∈ R, (17b)
|vn|2 ≤ 1, n = 1, . . . , N, (17c)
hk(v) ≥ Cgk(v), k = 1, . . . ,K. (17d)
Due to the non-convexity of the matrix product terms in (15)
and (16), the constraints in (17d) are still non-convex w.r.t. the
optimization variable v, where denoting V = vvH confirms
that V  0 and rank(V) = 1. Since the rank-1 constraint is
non-convex, we proceed to apply the SDR technique to relax
this constraint. By substituting vHAvvHBv = Tr(AVBV)
and vHCv = Tr(CV), where A, B, and C are any positive
semi-definite matrices and Tr(·) is the trace of a matrix, we
can now consider that hk(V) and gk(V) are both convex w.r.t.
V. Finally, the constraints in (17d) are all in forms of the
Difference of Convex (DC) functions for a given C, which can
be globally optimized by standard techniques such as branch-
and-bound and cutting planes algorithms. To further reduce
the complexity of the optimization, we propose an efficient
suboptimal solution based on the SCA technique where we
apply the Taylor expansion at V(m) which results in
hk(V)=hk(V
(m))+Tr(Re{∇hk(V(m))H(V−V(m))}).
(18)
Moreover, we introduce a base vector en, whose nth element
is 1 and others 0, to express the constraints in (17c) with V,
which can be shown as |vn|2 =
∣∣vHen∣∣2 = vHeneHn v =
Clb1,k =
1
Tc
log2
(
1 +
K2abσ
4
ek
−Kab(Kaek +Kbek)σ2bσ2ek
((Kaek +Kbek)σ
2
ek
+ σ4ek)(Kab(σ
2
a + σ
2
b ) + σ
2
aσ
2
b )
)
. (11)
4Algorithm 1 Proposed SDR-SCA based Iterative Optimization
Input: Rarb, RΣ, σ2hab , σ
2
Σ, σ
2, K, , M , Cmax.
Output: v.
1: Initialize Cmin = 0, and set C(t) = (Cmax + Cmin)/2.
2: repeat (Bisection search for C)
3: repeat (SDR-SCA algorithm for V)
4: For given C(t), when m = 1, initialize a positive
semi-definite reflecting coefficient matrix V(1) randomly;
when m > 1, given V(m−1), find the optimal optimization
variable V(m) according to the problem (18).
5: Update m = m+ 1.
6: until the optimization variable V reaches convergence
or m = M .
7: if the aforementioned problem is solvable then
8: record Vopt = V(m) of the current iteration, then
update Cmin = C(t);
9: else C(t) is unreachable, then update Cmax = C(t).
10: end if
11: until the difference (Cmax − Cmin) is below .
12: Recover v from Vopt by Gaussian randomization [11].
Tr(EnV) ≤ 1, where En = eneHn . As a result, the optimiza-
tion problem can be re-expressed as
max
V,C
C (19a)
s.t. C ∈ R,V  0, (19b)
Tr(EnV) ≤ 1, n = 1, . . . , N, (19c)
Cgk(V)− hk(V) ≤ 0, k = 1, . . . ,K. (19d)
Therefore, we have successfully convexified the IRS opti-
mization problem in (19) which can be solved by alternatively
optimizing V and C. Algorithm 1 details the proposed SDR-
SCA based algorithm, where  denotes a small convergence
threshold, M is the maximum number of iterations, and Cmax
is a sufficiently large number. Note that the proposed SDR-
SCA based algorithm can solve the problem with a worst case
complexity of O(max{N,K}4N1/2M¯ log2(Cmax/)), where
M¯ is the average number of iterations. This is a polynomial
complexity algorithm, which is more efficient than standard
branch-and-bound algorithm with exponential complexity of
O((1/δAδP)KN ), where δA and δP are the discrete quantiza-
tion intervals of amplitude and phase.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section presents simulation results to highlight the
performance advantage of IRS for secret key generation in
wireless networks. We consider the network scenario in Fig. 2,
where Alice, Bob, and the central point of Rose are located
at (5, 0, 20), (3, 100, 0), and (0, 100, 2), respectively.
For eavesdroppers, we consider two cases: (1) K Eves are
randomly distributed in a circle of radius R centered on Bob,
(2) K Eves are randomly distributed in a circle of radius R
centered on Alice. The simulation parameters are shown in
Table I, if not specifically mentioned.
The direct channel between Alice and Bob h˜ab is gen-
erated by h˜ab =
√
ζ0d
−cab
ab gab, where dab and cab are the
Fig. 2. Simulation setup: (1) Eves around Bob and (2) Eves around Alice.
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Carrier frequency 1 GHz.
Path loss at 1 m ζ0 = –30 dB.
IRS configuration Uniform rectangular array (URA) with 5 rows
and N/5 columns, λ spacing.
Path loss exponent a) cab = caek= 5, car = 3.5, cbek= crb = crek= 2;
b) cab = cbek= 5, car = crek= 3.5, cbek= crb = 2.
Rician factor a) κab=κaek= 3, κar =κrb =κrek= 2, κbek= 5;
b) κab=κbek= 3, κar =κrb =κrek= 2, κaek= 5.
Other parameters σ2 = –105 dB, Tc = 1 s,  = 0.01, L = M = 50.
distance from Alice to Bob, and the path loss exponent,
respectively. The small-scale fading component gab is assumed
to be Rician fading defined as gab =
√
κab/(1 + κab)g
LoS
ab +√
1/(1 + κab)g
NLoS
ab , where κab is the Rician factor, while
gLoSab and g
NLoS
ab are the deterministic LoS and Rayleigh
non-LoS (NLoS) components. The same channel model is
employed for all other channels h˜aek , h˜bek , h˜ar, h˜br, and h˜rek .
Since Eves are assumed to be located around either Alice or
Bob, the Pearson correlation coefficient ρ = (J0(2pid/λ))2
is considered between the NLoS components at locations
separated by distance d, where J0(·) is the Bessel function of
the first kind, and λ is the wavelength. We note that for secret
key generation, the effect of large-scale fading is removed
to ensure a large uncorrelation of channels among spatially
distributed nodes and thus the randomness of generated keys.
Therefore, we normalize the channel observations at each node
as hD = h˜D/‖h˜D‖2, where ‖·‖2 is the Euclidean norm. In
the simulations, we also consider two benchmark schemes of
without IRS and IRS with random shifting for the reflecting
coefficients.
Fig. 3 shows the secret key capacity versus the number of
IRS elements, N , for case (1), where Eves are located around
Bob. We see that increasing the size of the IRS results in
a significant improvement in the secret key capacity of our
SDR-SCA scheme. Furthermore, we observe that SDR-SCA
outperforms the two benchmark schemes for the entire range
of N . The figure also shows that the IRS secret key capacity
increases with decreasing κ = κrb =κrek which corresponds
to a weaker LoS path. This is because a lower κ provides
more randomness in the wireless channels leading to lower
correlations between the legitimate and eavesdropper channels.
5Fig. 3. Achievable secret key capacity versus the number of IRS reflecting
elements N in case (1), under different Rician factors with K = 2, R = λ.
Fig. 4. Achievable secret key capacity versus the number of Eves K in case
(1), under different distribution radiuses of Eves with N = 20.
If the channel statistics are unavailable, the IRS with random
shifting only results in a small performance improvement
compared to the case without IRS.
In Fig. 4, we see that the achievable secret key capacity
decreases with increasing number of Eves. We also find that
the proposed SDR-SCA scheme significantly outperforms the
two benchmark schemes by at least 0.1 bps. Compared with
Fig. 3, we observe that the increasing number of Eves only has
a small negative impact on the performance. As expected, the
secret key capacity improves when there is a greater average
distance between the eavesdroppers with R = λ.
In Fig. 5, we compare the secret key capacity of cases (1)
and (2). The figure shows that the location of the eavesdrop-
pers has a significant impact on the IRS secret key capacity
whilst there is negligible impact on the non-IRS scheme.
Specifically, we highlight that IRS can achieve a higher secret
key capacity in case (1) when Eves are located around Bob.
This is because in case (1), the IRS is also located closer
to Eves and thus the IRS reflecting components will have a
higher contribution to the eavesdropping channels compared to
case (2) where the IRS is further away from the Eves. When
the IRS is closer to Eves, the correlations Kaek and Kbek
in our derived capacity expression in (5) can be significantly
reduced by our proposed IRS optimization, which leads to a
great improvement in the secret key capacity.
Fig. 5. Achievable secret key capacity versus the number of Eves K in both
cases (1) and (2) with N = 20, R = λ.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We derived a new lower bound on the secret key capac-
ity of IRS assisted wireless networks with multiple non-
colluding eavesdroppers. Based on this bound, an efficient
SDR-SCA optimization algorithm was proposed to design the
IRS reflecting coefficient matrix that maximizes the minimum
achievable secret key capacity for the worst-case eavesdropper.
Simulations showed that the achievable secret key capacity can
be efficiently improved with our proposed IRS optimization al-
gorithm for different eavesdropper locations and LoS channels
conditions.
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